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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT RAISE CONCERNS
ABOUT WHETHER THE AIRLINE INDUSTRIES' ON-
LINE BUSINESS VENTURES ARE PROTECTED
CHRISTOPHER T. BLACKFORD :*
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and institu-
tions. But laws and institutions must go hand-in-hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed,
more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths dis-
covered and manners and opinions change, with change of cir-
cumstances, institutions must advance also to keep pace with the
times.
Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past or
present are certain to miss the future.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
WAnEN ENTREPRENEURS and scientists alike embraced the
-ternet as a source of endless opportunities, its infrastruc-
ture experienced unprecedented growth. Although unrespon-
sive at first, businesses and individuals eventually accepted the
Internet and the entrepreneurial ingenuity associated with it. In
the end, the role of electronic communications in the world has
expanded exponentially since the 1980s.1 Furthermore, almost
all facets of the business community have become, and continue
to become, increasingly connected and dependent upon both
the Internet and other forms of electronic communications.
While this pattern of growth seems mutually beneficial to almost
everyone involved, the high level of symbiotic dependence has
exposed parties to the ever increasing prospect of being victim-
ized by computer crimes.4 The threat of a business being ex-
posed to either an unauthorized disclosure of information, or
rampant computer criminal activity such as eavesdropping, 5 in-
sider transgression,6 and spoofing 7 is no longer a remote
possibility.
3 While very few computers were linked to the Internet in 1981, the Internet
now allows millions of people to communicate and exchange information
through an international network of interconnected computers. See Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997).
4 In a recent study of computer crimes, "eighty-five percent of respondents
detected computer security breaches within the last twelve months," and "thir-
teen percent of respondents reported theft of transaction information." John
McElwaine, Cyber Attacks, 13 S.C. LxWVER 20, 22 (2002) (citing Richard Powers,
2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, Vol. 7, No. 1, Computer Security
Institute (Spring 2001)). In 1999, the FBI opened 547 computer intrusion cases,
and in 1999 that number escalated to 1,154 cases. Id. at 21 (quoting Louis Freeh,
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Senate judiciary Sub-
committee for Technology, Terrorism and Government Information (Mar. 28,
2000)).
5 Eavesdropping involves the "passive collection of information through In-
ternet channels." Id. at 22. Cyber criminals will install programs that enable
them to intercept log on identifiers and passwords. With this information, the
individual's identity is replicated and personal information becomes freely acces-
sible. Id.
6 "An insider is a current or former employee of a company who possesses
knowledge of the company's network that allows them to gain unrestricted ac-
cess... " Id. Such access is commonly used for two reasons: (1) to cause damage
2003]
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While it is true that crime is a facet of life that businesses
should be prepared to encounter, the issue of cyber-exposure is
particularly troubling for a business because of the potential ec-
onomic impact and the lack of appropriate legal protection.8
Although the business world is already familiar with the impact
that denial of service attacks9 had on Internet sites such as Ya-
hoo!, Amazon.com, eBay, CNN, and Buy.com,' ° regulatory agen-
cies do not appear to be concerned about the vulnerability of
other industries who have evolved their business plans around
the Internet.
Airlines, which rely heavily upon their own website's sales, are
prime examples of business entities that are economically vul-
nerable to cyber exposure." Considering the cumulative cost
associated with developing and maintaining airline web sites, 2
the net profits generated by the business, 13 and the risks associ-
ated with maintaining secure business transactions over the web,
the $110 billion per year airline industry is in danger of endur-
ing considerable economic loss. Airline vulnerability is ampli-
fied by the fractured status of the airlines in a post-September
l1th world.14 Although some economists have noted signs of
to the system, or (2) to steal proprietary data. Id. Insiders are the largest threat of
electronic theft. Id.
7 "Spoofing is accomplished by deceiving a computer user into believing that it
[sic] is disclosing information to a trusted source." Id.
8 The 2001 Computer Crime and Security Survey reported that 186 respondents
suffered a combined financial loss of $377,828,700. Id.
9 "A denial of service attack is intended to tie up a computer system's resources
to such an extent that the system is unresponsive or crashes." Id. (citing How a
Denial of Service Attack Works, CNET News.com (Feb. 9, 2000), at http://
www.cnet.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2003)). A "visitor" sends multiple authentica-
tion requests with false return addresses to a victim server. Id. As these false
requests continue and the victim server continues to try and locate the visitor, the
victim server's system resources are consumed. Id.
10 Id. at 21.
11 The entire competitive landscape of the on-line travel industry has been val-
ued at roughly $31 billion and has been labeled as "one of the fastest growing
niches of e-commerce." Rachel Konrad & Greg Sandoval, Orbitz Rivals Cy Foul,
Claim Monopoly in Air Travel, CNET News.com (Apr. 11, 2002), at http:// www.
news.com./2009-1017-879314.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
12 Airlines such as United, American, Delta, Northwest, and Continental re-
portedly invested $145 million in an on-line travel venture known as "T2." Id.
13 On-line travel agencies such as Orbitz and Expedia reached $1 billion in
annual revenue in the year 2000. Id.
14 Due to curtailed flights and plummeting passenger traffic, airlines suffered
extraordinary losses after the September l1th terror attacks. In the immediate
year after the September 11 th attacks, "industry losses totaled $7.7 billion despite
emergency federal cash infusions of $5 billion . . . " Daniel G. Fricker, Airlines
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improvement in air travel, 5 it is clear that the airline industry
still faces turbulent economic times.
16
The combination of the airline industry's current financial
problems along with the potential for further economic down-
fall should trigger concerns about what remedies an airline will
be entitled to if its web-based business is exposed to an unautho-
rized cyber attack. More importantly, the legal community
should be concerned about how the current laws are being judi-
cially interpreted. Although the current laws enacted by Con-
gress to police the Internet are far from clear, 17 judicial
constructions of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
(ECPA) have been nothing short of atrocious. Instead of truly
understanding the intricate technological details of the Internet
and considering how technological advancements affect the stat-
utory rules that are applied, judges have employed linguistic
gymnastics and established meaningless textual dichotomies be-
tween the governing statutes in an effort to maintain outdated
precedents. Such judicial interpretations have created a mud-
Struggle in Post-9/11 Climate, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 31, 2002), at http://
www.freep.com/money/business/ air31_20020831.htm (last visited Sept. 7,
2003). The staggering losses have forced airlines such as USAirways and United
Airlines to declare bankruptcy. Id. Other carriers who are wavering on the point
of bankruptcy will require massive restructuring to continue. Id.
15 Despite the spiraling costs of airline security, lost jobs have been regained
and passengers are slowly returning to the airports. Arlene Fleming, Airline Losses
After September 11th: The Day That Airline Travel Changed, Airtravel.About.com
(Nov. 22, 2002), at http://airtravel.about.com/library/weekly/aa09O9O2 a.htm
(last visited Aug. 27, 2003).
16 Experts' predictions have been proven true as the nations major airlines
recently reported a combined loss of more than $9 billion. Dave Carpenter,
United Airlines' Parent Loses $3.2 Billion, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Jan. 31, 2003), at
http://w.sltrib.com/2003/Feb/02012003/Business/252 7 8.asp (last visited
Sept. 7, 2003). While "[t]he industry as a whole has a chance to turn a profit in
2004, . . . much of that money will be used to repay the debt from flnding 2001
and 2002 losses." Fricker, supra note 14.
17 The intersection of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")
and the Stored Communications Act ("SCA") is a "complex, often convoluted,
area of the law." Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.
2002) (citing United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also
SteveJackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir.
1994) (stating that the Wiretap Act "is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of
clarity"). The difficulty is further compounded by the fact that "the ECPA was
written prior to the advent of the Internet and the World Wide Web." Konop, 302
F.3d at 874. Courts are thus essentially confined to using an existing statutory
framework that is ill-suited for dealing with modern forms of web communication
and inappropriate for the purpose of administering justice. Id.
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died pool of jurisprudence that affords airlines and other busi-
nesses a legislative bill without teeth.
This comment scrutinizes the economic, business-oriented
ramifications of recent judicial reviews of the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act in the context of electronic communi-
cations and web sites. It specifically questions how airlines with
significant on-line business ventures will be affected. The com-
ment is divided into five sections and will first examine the his-
torical development of the relevant case law protecting the
privacy of electronic communications. This part of the com-
ment will also address the history of the ECPA's passage into law
and Congress' intended purpose. The third section discusses
the implications of the different judicial constructions of the
ECPA's provisions, and the fourth section of this comment pro-
poses an interpretation of the ECPA that actually affords airlines
and other businesses the appropriate statutory protection re-
quired to succeed in a post-September l1th world. Finally, this
article concludes that courts should reconsider the current clas-
sification of unauthorized web site access and the type of statu-
tory protection that it triggers, because the current judicial
standards will likely promote, rather than deter, future com-
puter criminal activity and unauthorized disclosure in the cyber
world.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE JURISPRUDENCE
SURROUNDING "ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS"
A. PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE ECPA:
THE OMNIBUs ACT
Congress first addressed the need to protect privacy in the
context of evolving technology by introducing Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.' 8 Title III pros-
cribes the interception or disclosure of wire or oral communica-
tions and provides a procedure through which law enforcement
officials are authorized to intercept such communications in
limited circumstances. 9 The enactment of Title III was signifi-
cant. Congress had finally recognized that technological devel-
18 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Tit. III, 82
Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2000)).
19 Title III punished "any person who ... willfully intercepts, endeavors to
intercept, or procures any other person to intercept, any wire or oral communi-
cation . . . " 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1968).
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opments enable the interception of personal and commercial
communications.20 Title III, however, was relatively limited.2'
Title III prohibited only the interception of communications
that could be heard and understood by humans as sound.12 Fur-
thermore, the language of the statute was narrowly construed to
restrict the act of interception to the contemporaneous acquisi-
tion of communication.2" In other words, protection from an
unauthorized interception was confined to a narrow time frame
in which transmission and acquisition of the communication oc-
curred at the exact same time.
24
B. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT OF 1986
In 1986, Congress became concerned with federal privacy
protections and potential harms that new computer and tele-
communications technologies posed for the protection of confi-
dential business information.2 5 As a result, Congress sought to
increase protection of personal and commercial communica-
tions. Congress acted by modifying the Wire and Electronic
Communications Interception and Interception of Oral Com-
munications Act ("Wiretap Act") through the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act (ECPA) of 1986. In creating the ECPA,
Congress substantially amended the Wiretap Act 26 and created
the Stored Communications Act (SCA),27 thus providing a statu-
tory umbrella of protection for electronic communications.28
20 S. REp. No. 90-1097, at 42 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2156.
21 "While Congress clearly was concerned with the protection of individual's
privacy interests against unjustified intrusions, it did not attempt through Title III
to deal with all such intrusions." United States v. Turk, 526 F.2d 654, 658-59 (5th
Cir. 1976) (emphasis added). Title III dealt only with problems associated with
wiretapping and electronic surveillance. See id. at 659 (citations omitted).
22 See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1977).
23 Turk, 526 F.2d at 659.
24 The narrow judicial construction of the term "intercept" emanated from the
influential case of United States v. Turk. At issue in Turk was whether police inter-
cepted a communication when they played back a tape of a telephone call that
had been previously recorded by a third party. Id. at 656-58. The Fifth Circuit
held that no unlawful interception occurred. Id. at 659. The court reasoned that
"the words 'acquisition ... through the use of any ... device' suggests that the
central concern is with the activity engaged in at the time of the oral communica-
tion..." Id. at 658.
25 S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 42 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2156.
26 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
27 Id. §§ 2701-2711.
8 The Wiretap Act and the SCA have since been amended numerous times.
Most recently, the Wiretap Act and the SCA were amended by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
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Although Congress should be commended for recognizing that
it had not fully addressed the rapid advances in communication
technologies wrought by the proliferation of computers, the
original enactment of the ECPA can scarcely be considered a
model of clarity.29 When neither a Congressional nor a judicial
forum are technologically competent enough to comprehend
the role of technology in the advancement of communications,
efforts to take into account the technological realities of elec-
tronic communications will be misplaced.
1. Title I of the ECPA: The Federal Wiretap Act
The 1986 Federal Wiretap Act provides in relevant part, with
certain exceptions, that there is a criminal or civil cause of ac-
tion against any person who:
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures
any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire,
oral, or electronic communication;
(b) intentionally uses, endeavors to use, or procures any other
person to use or endeavor to use any electronic, mechanical, or
other device to intercept any oral communication... ;
(c) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection; [or]
(d) intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other
person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communica-
tion, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic
communication in violation of this subsection.3 °
The most significant change made by the enactment of the
ECPA was the addition of the "electronic communications"'"
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act). Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001).
29 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that the Wire-
tap Act "is famous (if not infamous) for its lack of clarity." Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit criticized further, stating that the
Fifth Circuit "might have put the matter too mildly." United States v. Smith, 155
F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998).
30 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a)-(d) (1986).
31 An "electronic communication" was defined, with certain exceptions, as
"any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any
nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoe-
lectric, or photo-optical system... " Id. § 2510(12).
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category to the Wiretap Act.3 2 Another notable change intro-
duced by the Act was the change in the definition of "wire com-
munication,"" which was both narrowed and broadened. The
definition of "wire communication" was narrowed from "any
communication" made over the wires to "any aural transfer"
made over the wires, 4 and it was broadened to include "any
electronic storage of such communication."" These statutory
changes have proven to be the subject of much judicial debate.
The decision to include electronic storage in the definition of
"wire communication" was especially problematic, because the
correlating definition of "electronic communication" contained
no reference for a similar form of storage medium.
As noted, the Wiretap Act provided for either a civil or crimi-
nal cause of action to punish violators. Criminal prosecution of
an individual who violates the Wiretap Act under section 2511
may provide for incarceration for a period up to five years,36
while a suit for civil damages under section 2520 may provide
for appropriate equitable and declaratory relief, punitive dam-
ages, and reasonable attorney's fees. 7
2. Title II of the ECPA: Stored Communications Act
The 1986 Stored Communications Act also provides protec-
tion for private communications, barring unauthorized access to
an electronic communication while it is in electronic storage.
However, it does not provide the same type or amount of protec-
tion as the Wiretap Act. Aside from the notable difference be-
tween the two acts concerning the forms of communication
protected, the SCA provides less stringent criminal and civil
penalties. 9
32 See S. RP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557
(stating that the ECPA amended the Wiretap Act to address the interception of
electronic communications).
33 A "wire communication" was defined, with certain exceptions, as "any aural
transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmis-
sion of communications by the aid of wire, cable or other like connection be-
tween the point of origin and the point of reception ... and such term includes any




36 Id. § 2511(4).
37 Id. § 2520.
38 Id. § 2701.
39 Compare id. §§ 2511(4) (a), 2520(c) (2) (B) (imposing penalties of up to five
years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for unlawfully intercepting an electronic
2003] 827
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The SCA provides in relative part, with certain exceptions,
that there is a criminal or civil cause of action against one who:
(1) intentionally access[es] without authorization a facility
through which an electronic communication service is provided;
or
(2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access that facility,
and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents authorized access to a
wire or electronic communication while it is in electronic storage
in such system.4"
While the plain language of the SCA seems to suggest that the
statute was enacted to address access to stored wire and elec-
tronic communications and transactional records,4 1. judicial
opinions illustrate that attorneys should not jump to such a
conclusion.
3. Judicial Interpretations of the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act
The problems legal scholars and judges encounter when at-
tempting to construe the ECPA become more readily apparent
when trying to conceptualize both the Wiretap Act and the SCA
in one harmonious legal relationship. Individuals have strug-
gled, and continue to struggle, to determine the boundaries of
the relationship between the Wiretap Act and the SCA.42
The following cases are notable examples of courts struggling
to determine whether a particular set of facts entitle one to re-
lief under either the Wiretap Act or the SCA. Because the ECPA
remained largely unchanged until the recent passage of the
2001 USA Patriot Act,43 these cases give an insight into the judi-
cial development of the ECPA.
communication), with id. §§ 2701 (b) (1) (A), 2707(c) (imposing penalties of up to
one year imprisonment and a $1,000 fine for unlawfully accessing a stored
communication).
40 Id. § 2701.
41 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
42 See Tatsuya Akamine, Proposal for a Fair Statutory Interpretation: E-Mail Stored in
a Service Provider Computer is Subject to an Interception Under the Federal Wiretap Act, 7
J.L. & POL'Y 519, 528 (1999).
43 After the passage of the ECPA in 1986 and before the enactment of the USA
Patriot Act in 2001, only minor amendments were made in 1994 and 1996.
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a. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service, 36
F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994)
Suspecting that a computer text file detailing a company's
emergency 911 telephone system had been copied and was avail-
able as a document in e-mail messages on an electronic bulletin
board system, 4 4 the United States Secret Service ("Secret Ser-
vice") seized the computer that hosted the electronic bulletin
board service by raiding the offices of Steve Jackson Games, Inc.
Consequently, the Secret Service seized 162 items of unread
(and un-retrieved), private e-mail messages from the hard drive
of the computer running the bulletin board system. Steve Jack-
son and other intended recipients of the unread, private e-mail,
filed suit against the Secret Service claiming that the agency had
intercepted and disclosed private communications in violation
of both the Wiretap Act and the SCA.4 5
The district court held that the Secret Service had violated the
SCA, but not the Wiretap Act.46 Relying on the Fifth Circuit's
previous narrow interpretation of intercept in United States v.
Turk,4 7 the district court concluded that there was no violation
of the Wiretap Act because the Government's acquisition of the
contents of the electronic communications was not contempora-
neous with the transmission of those communications.48 The
basis for finding a violation of the SCA was seizure of the stored
electronic communications without complying with the statutory
provisions.49 Not finding the sole statutory damage award under
the SCA sufficient, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit.50
The issue for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether
the seizure of a computer, used to operate an electronic bulletin
board system and thus containing unread (and un-retrieved)
private e-mail messages, constitutes an intercept proscribed by
44 Running off of a computer that acts like a server, an electronic bulletin
board system is a collection of private e-mails maintained on the computer's hard
disk drive temporarily until the e-mail addressees access the electronic bulletin
board system to retrieve their e-mail messages. After receiving their e-mail, recip-
ients chose to either delete the e-mail message or store it on the electronic bulle-
tin board computer's hard disk drive. SteveJackson Games, 36 F.3d at 458-59.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 459.
47 Turk, 526 F.2d at 654.
48 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 459-60.
49 Id. at 459.
50 Id. at 457. The plaintiffs sought the increased damage award warranted by
the Wiretap Act. Id. at 460.
2003] 829
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the Federal Wiretap Act or the SCA.51 For guidance in resolving
the issue, the court of appeals examined the technical defini-
tions within the ECPA, the legislative history, and the statutory
procedures and requirements for both Acts. When comparing
the statutory definitions of wire and electronic communications,
the court of appeals observed that unlike the definition of "wire
communication, '5 2 the definition of "electronic communica-
tion ' 53 does not include electronic storage of such communica-
tion. 54 The omission of the phrase "electronic storage of such
communication" from the definition of "electronic communica-
tion" was seen as critical in determining what constituted an in-
tercept.55 The court of appeals stated that this omission and the
use of the word "transfer" in the definition of "electronic com-
munication" "reflect that Congress did not intend for 'intercept'
to apply to 'electronic communications' when those communi-
cations are in 'electronic storage."' 5 6 Because the e-mail at issue
was in electronic storage, the court of appeals concluded that
the Secret Service's seizure of the e-mails was not an intercep-
tion, and consequently, not a violation of the Wiretap Act.
57
To support the conclusion that Congress did not intend for
the term intercept to apply to electronic communications in
electronic storage, the court of appeals pointed to the ECPA's
legislative history. Specifically, the court noted that the Senate
Report accompanying the ECPA indicates that Congress did not
intend to change the narrow definition of intercept, which re-
quires any acquisition to be contemporaneous with transmis-
sion." If the narrow definition of intercept requiring
contemporaneous acquisition holds, the court reasoned that
electronic communications in storage, which have already been
transmitted, cannot be intercepted.
51 Id.
52 See supra note 33.
53 See supra note 31.
54 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461.
55 Id.
-56 Id. at 461-62 (emphasis added).
57 Id. at 461.
58 Id. at 462. The Senate Report provides that "[s]ection 101(a)(3) of the
[ECPA] amends the definition of the term 'intercept' in current section 2510(4)
of title 18 to cover electronic communications. The definition of 'intercept'
under current law is retained with respect to wire and oral communications ex-
cept that the term 'or other' is inserted after 'aural."' S. REp. No. 99-541, at 13
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3567, construed in Steve Jackson Games,
36 F.3d at 462.
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Additionally, the court implied that if the term "intercept" did
apply to electronic communications in storage, conduct prohib-
ited under the Wiretap Act would also provide a cause of action
under the SCA. In light of express differences between the sub-
stantive and procedural requirements of the Wiretap Act and
SCA, the court determined that Congress could not have in-
tended for prohibited conduct to provide a cause of action
under both statutes.59 For example, whereas a governmental en-
tity only requires a search warrant to access the contents of a
stored electronic communication that has been in storage for
less than 180 days,6" the requirements for authorization to inter-
cept a stored wire communication are much more extensive and
stringent.6" When procedural differences exist between the two
statutes, a cause of action available under both statutes would
result in the exploitation of the less stringent requirements.
b. United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998)
After calling fellow employee Angela Bravo de Rueda
("Bravo") and leaving a voicemail message describing his in-
volvement in insider trading, Richard Smith ("Smith") came
under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
for eleven counts of insider trading.62 Unbeknownst to Smith or
Bravo, a third employee, Linda Alexander-Gore ("Gore"), ac-
cessed Bravo's voice mailbox and forwarded the stored message
to her mailbox.63 Gore then copied the communication and dis-
closed it to the U.S. Attorney's Office.64 Although the district
court suppressed the actual voicemail message as evidence after
determining that it had been illegally "intercepted" within the
meaning of the Wiretap Act, it refused to suppress the remain-
der of the evidence that was derived from the illegal wiretap.65
Claiming that all evidence emanating from the illegal wiretap
should have been suppressed, Smith appealed to the Court of
Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.66 The Government countered by
59 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462-63.
60 Id. at 463 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)).
61 Id. at 462-63 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518 andJAMEs G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELEC-
TRONIC SURVEILLANCE, § 4.10 at 4-126 - 4-127 (1994)).
62 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1053-54. Smith was later indicted and found guilty on
eleven counts of insider trading in violation of section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. Id. at 1054.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 1055.
66 Id.
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arguing that the district court erred in concluding that the Wire-
tap Act governs the case.67 The Government contended that
rather than applying the Wiretap Act, the district court should
have applied the SCA.68
Thus, the question the Ninth Circuit faced was whether the
Wiretap Act or the SCA controls when a voicemail message on a
telephone is forwarded to another voice mailbox and eventually
taped. In other words, the court had to determine the precise
nature of the intersection between the Wiretap Act and the
SCA.6 9 While the court of appeals had no doubt that the
voicemail message was a "wire communication" as defined in
both the Wiretap Act and the SCA,70 and that the message was in
"storage" within the voicemail system,7 ' the court struggled with
the task of determining which statute applied. Particularly per-
plexing for the court was how Congress seemed to have made
the issue regarding voicemail messages subject to both statutes
when the statutes appear, on their faces, to be mutually
exclusive.72
The Government attempted to alleviate the textual tension in
the court by promoting the Turk case, one which narrowly con-
strued the word "intercept" to connote contemporaneity. The
Ninth Circuit, however, refused to adopt the Turk reading of
67 Id.
68 Id. The Government sought out the application of the SCA rather than the
Wiretap Act, because unlike the Wiretap Act, the SCA expressly rules out suppres-
sion of evidence as a remedy. Id. at 1056; see 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (1993) (stating
specifically that section 2707's civil cause of action and section 2701 (b)'s criminal
penalties "are the onlyjudicial remedies and sanctions for violations of the Stored
Communications Act").
69 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1056.
70 See supra note 33. The SCA obtains its definitions from the Wiretap Act.
71 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1056.
72 Id. The court of appeals noted that the legislative history was of no help
whatsoever. Id. at 1056 n.9. While the addition of the phrase "and such term[s]
include any electronic storage of such communication" to the definition of wire
communication in section 2510(1) and the Senate Report, which observes that
"wire communications in storage like voice mail, remain wire communications, and
are protected accordingly[,]" suggest that the Wiretap Act controls, the House
Report suggests a different conclusion. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 99-541 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3566). The House Report provides:
An "electronic mail" service, which permits a sender to transmit a
digital message to the service's facility, where it is held in storage
until the addressee requests it, would be subject to Section 2701. A
"voice mail" service operates in much the same way .... It would likewise be
subject to Section 2701."
Id. (quoting H.R. Rxp. No. 99-647, at 63 (1986)).
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"intercept."7 The court refused to follow the Government's
proposition74 for numerous reasons. First, the court stated that
it did not have the ability to look beyond the statutorily created
definition of "intercept" when, as in this case, the meaning of
the word is clearly explained in the statute.75 Second, and more
importantly, the court concluded that the Turk interpretation of
"intercept" was no longer persuasive because when Turk was de-
cided, the statutory definition of "wire communication" did not
yet include stored information, and the SCA had not yet been
created.76 Finally, the court refused to adopt the contempora-
neous requirement when construing the word "intercept" be-
cause it would render part of the definition of "wire
communication" meaningless.77 The part of the definition of
"wire communication" referring to the inclusion of stored infor-
mation would be rendered meaningless because "messages in
electronic storage cannot, by definition, be acquired contempo-
raneously."7 " Thus, the court concluded that adopting the con-
temporaneous requirement when construing the word intercept
is not viable.
73 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1056-58. The court noted that the "only cases involving
wire communications that have adopted the narrow definition of "interception"
have done so with little analysis." Id. at 1057 n.11.
74 The court thought that the Government's position would establish a "fairly
distinct division of regulatory labor, with the Wiretap Act governing the retrieval
of wire communications while in progress and the Stored Communications Act gov-
erning the retrieval of wire communications while in storage." Id. at 1056-57. For
similar treatment of the two acts, see Thomas R. Greenberg, Comment, E-Mail
and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 Am. U.L. REv. 219
(1994).
75 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 (citing Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 393 (1979)
("As a rule, a definition which declares what a term means ...excludes any
meaning that is not stated.") (other citations omitted), and Perrin v. United
States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) ("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is
that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary,
contemporary, common meaning.") (emphasis added)).
76 Id. at 1057 n. 11. The court could not square the changes in the Wiretap Act
with the narrow reading of intercept because messages in storage cannot be ac-
quired contemporaneously. The court thus concluded that the Turk definition
of intercept, "at least in the context of wire communications," had been statuto-
rily overruled. Id.
77 Id. at 1058. The court reasoned that such an interpretation "flies in the face
of 'the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that no provision [of a statute]
should be construed to be entirely redundant."' Id. (quoting Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1998), and Colautti, 439 U.S. at 392 ("[It is an] elemen-
tary canon of statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted so as not
to render one part inoperative.")).
78 Id.
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Rather than adopt the definition of intercept that necessarily
entails contemporaneity, the Ninth Circuit postulated a theory
in which unlawful "access" is a lesser-included offense of unlaw-
ful "interception" that turns on the degree of intrusion. The
court explained the lesser-included offense theory as follows:
[T] he word "intercept" entails actually acquiring the contents of a
communication, whereas the word "access" merely involves being
in a position to acquire the contents of a communication. In
other words, "access[ ]" is for all intents and purposes, a lesser
included offense (or tort as the case may be) of "interception."79
The court found support for its "more holistically sound ap-
proach" in both textual and structural considerations.8' First,
the court found its construction to comport with the statutory
definitions of "intercept"8 1 and "access. 8 2 Intercept, which en-
tails acquisition, is distinct from access, which is not statutorily
defined, but commonly means "to gain access to." '8 The court
cited further support in the ECPA by distinguishing the broad
language of the SCA, which refers to accessing a stored commu-
nications facility, from the language of the Wiretap Act, which
refers to intercepting the wire communication. 4 Finally, the
court of appeals points to the contrasting penalty schemes that
are triggered when the ECPA is violated as support for its lesser-
included offense theory.85 The court of appeals explained the
significance of the contrasting penalty scheme as follows:
The fact that criminal violations of the Wiretap Act are punished
more severely than those of the Stored Communications Act re-
flects Congress's considered judgment regarding the relative cul-
pability that attaches to violations of those provisions and
supports our conclusion that a violation of the latter is, concep-
tually, a "lesser included offense" of the former.86
79 Id.
80 Id. at 1058-59.
S The word "intercept" is defined as follows: "the aural or other acquisition of
the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of
any electronic, mechanical, or other device." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1986).
82 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1059 (quoting WEBSTER'S NINTH COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
49 (1986)).
83 Id. at 1058.
84 Id. at 1058-59 (comparing 18 U.S.C. § 2701 with § 2515).
85 Id. at 1059. While a person in a position to acquire a wire communication
could be criminally prosecuted under section 2701 (b), which provides for incar-
ceration for a period up to two years, a person who actually intercepts the wire
communication could be criminally prosecuted under section 2511, which pro-
vides for incarceration for a period of up to five years. Id.
86 Id.
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Pursuant to the court's rejection of the narrow reading of in-
tercept and the adoption of the lesser included offense theory,
the court concluded that the SCA did not govern because
Gore's act of retrieving and recording Smith's voicemail mes-
sage constituted an interception under the Wiretap Act.8 7
c. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 1292 (2003)
Robert Konop, a pilot for Hawaiian Airlines ("Hawaiian"),
maintained a password-protected website on which he posted
criticisms of his employer and the Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA).S8 "Many of those criticisms related to Konop's opposi-
tion to labor concessions, which Hawaiian sought from ALPA."'9
Although Hawaiian's management was prohibited from viewing
the website, the Hawaiian vice president gained access to the
website using an employee's login name.9 °
Konop filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California, claiming that the access of his website under
false pretenses was an interception of electronic communica-
tions that violated both the Wiretap Act and the SCA.9 After
the district court granted Hawaiian summary judgment on the
claim of violating the Wiretap Act,9 2 the Ninth Circuit originally
reversed and remanded,93 but then withdrew its opinion after
87 Id.
88 Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 873.
9, Id. Although not discussed in this comment, Konop also claimed that Ha-
waiian: (1) violated the Railway Labor Act ("RLA") by accessing his website, dis-
closing the website's content to a union leader, and threatening to sue Konop for
defamation; and (2) violated the RLA by suspending him in retaliation for his
protected labor activities. Id.
92 Id. (granting summary judgment to Hawaiian on all of Konop's claims ex-
cept for the claim of retaliatory suspension). On the claim of retaliatory suspen-
sion, judgment was entered against Konop after a short bench trial. Id.
93 Id. (concluding that Konop had raised a triable issue of fact for all claims
that were dismissed on summary judgment). Contrary to the current opinion,
the withdrawn opinion was written to reflect that the court was "unpersuaded
that Congress intended one definition of 'intercept' to govern 'wire communica-
tions' and another to govern 'electronic communications."' Konop v. Hawaiian
Airlines, Inc., 236 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (opinion withdrawn). The
withdrawn opinion declined to follow the Turk contemporaneity requirement,
and further concluded that it was irrational to distinguish between communica-
tions on the basis of whether a communication is in storage or transmission. Id. at
1043-45 (emphasis added). The withdrawn opinion thus adopted the Smith lesser
included offense theory, holding that the "Wiretap Act protects electronic com-
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Hawaiian filed a petition for rehearing en banc.94 The Ninth Cir-
cuit then affirmed the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment against Konop on his Wiretap Act claims.95
The issue for the court of appeals was whether the access to
Konop's secure website violated either the Wiretap Act or the
SCA.96 Although the court found that Konop's website falls
under the definition of "electronic communication, it did not
find that Hawaiian "intercepted" an electronic communication
in violation of the Wiretap Act.9 8 The Konop court failed to find
an -"interception" by Hawaiian, because it concluded that Hawai-
ian's acquisition of Konop's website was not contemporaneous
with its transmission. 9 The Ninth Circuit's holding was pre-
mised upon its conclusion that the pre-ECPA narrow definition
of "intercept" was still appropriate with regard to "electronic
communications,"' 0  but overruled with respect to "wire
communications."'0 1
The Ninth Circuit's very narrow and limiting interpretation of
the term "intercept" in the context of electronic communica-
tions was supposedly based on Steve Jackson Games, Smith, and the
subsequent enactment of the USA Patriot Act.'0 2 The Ninth Cir-
cuit found the omission of the phrase "any electronic storage of
such communication" from the definition of "electronic com-
munications from interception when stored to the same extent as when in
transit." Id. at 1044, 1046.
94 Konop, 302 F.3d at 872. The petition for rehearing en banc was ordered
moot. Id.
95 Id. The court also affirmed thejudgment of the district court with respect to
Konop's retaliation claim under the RLA, but reversed "the district court's judg-
ment with respect to Konop's claims under the [SCA] and his remaining claims
under the [RLA]." Id.
96 Id. at 874.
97 Id. at 876.
9 Id. at 879.
- See id. at 878.
100 See id. at 877-78 (adopting the Turk definition of intercept).
10, Id. at 877 (citing Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 n.11). But see Smith, 155 F.3d at
1057 n.ll (stating that Turk's reading of intercept has at least been statutorily
overruled in the context of wire communications, but never stating that it has
been statutorily overruled with respect to wire communications only) (emphasis
added).
102 See Konop, 302 F.3d at 878. While the amendment to the USA Patriot Act
and the opinion of Steve Jackson Games could be construed as adopting the narrow
reading of intercept within the context of electronic communications, the opin-
ion in Smith should not be used to infer that the requirement of contemporaneity
applies to electronic communications. See infra note 107.
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munication"1 3 critical because the same phrase was included in
the definition of "wire communication."'0' 4 Following Steve Jack-
son Games, the court reasoned that Congress excluded the
phrase from the definition of "electronic communication" be-
cause "Congress did not intend for 'intercept' to apply to elec-
tronic communications when those communications are in
electronic storage."'01 5 The court of appeals further explained
that "Congress' inclusion of storage in the definition of "wire
communication" militated in favor of a broad definition of the
term intercept with respect to wire communications... "106 The
court of appeals thus relied on the familiar textual dichotomy
recognized in Steve Jackson Games. This court, however, used the
textual distinction in a different manner. It relied on the dis-
tinction between wire and electronic communications to main-
tain that Congress only intended for the narrow reading of
"intercept" to apply to electronic communications.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit further supported
judicial maintenance of a narrow intercept requirement for elec-
tronic communications by citing a subsequent legislative change
to the Wiretap Act, 10 7 which was enacted in the USA Patriot Act
of 2001.108 When Congress amended the Wiretap Act through
the USA Patriot Act, it eliminated the phrase "inclusion of stor-
age" from the definition of "wire communication."' °9 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that this Congressional action termi-
103 See supra note 31.
104 See supra note 32.
105 Konop, 302 F.3d at 877 (citing Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62, and
Wesley Coll. v. Pitts, 974 F. Stipp. 375, 386 (D. Del. 1997), afJ'd, 172 F.3d 861 (3d
Cir. 1998)). But see Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 462 (basing its conclusion on
finding the narrow reading of "intercept" to apply to wire communications).
106 Konop, 302 F.3d at 877.
107 Id. at 878 (stating that the elimination of the term storage from the defini-
tion of wire communication in the Wiretap Act supports the analysis of Steve Jack-
son Games and Smith).
108 USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 209, 115 Stat. 272, 283 (2001).
109 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2001). Under the USA Patriot Act, "wire communica-
tion" is defined as:
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facil-
ities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire,
cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the
point of reception (including the use of such connection in a
switching station) furnished or operated by any person engaged in
providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of inter-
state or foreign communications or communications affecting in-
terstate or foreign commerce.
8372003]
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nated the textual distinction between the two statutes and statu-
torily "re-instated the pre-ECPA definition of intercept -
acquisition contemporaneous with transmission - with respect
to wire communications."' 0 The court further argued that Con-
gress was aware of the judicial definition of "intercept" applied
to electronic communications, and thus accepted the notion of
contemporaneity when it chose not to modify the definition of
"electronic communications" in the USA Patriot Act."1
d. Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d
623 (E.D. Pa. 2001)
One of the issues before the court was whether the Wiretap
Act, the SCA, or neither act controlled when Nationwide Insur-
ance retrieved an employee's e-mail communications from its
electronic storage site. 1 2 The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a company's re-
trieval of an agent's e-mail from post-transmission storage impli-
cated neither the Wiretap Act nor the SCA."' The court's
holding was based on the conclusion that each act only protects
communication in the course of transmission. "4
Acknowledging the importance of understanding how e-mail
communications work, the district court explained the transmis-
sion of an e-mail by describing a system utilizing intermediate
storage,'1 5 backup protection storage," 6 and post-transmission
storage.' 17 The critical point in the transmission of an e-mail
communication, the court reasoned, was the point in time the
message is acquired. It is at this point when the transmission is
completed. "I Following Turk's narrow reading of the term "in-
110 Konop, 302 F.3d at 878. Of course, this reasoning assumes that the pre-
ECPA definition of intercept already applied to electronic communications. Id.
- Id. (assuming that courts were still using the pre-ECPA definition of inter-
cept with regard to electronic communications). But see supra note 107.
112 Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
"13 Id. at 637.
1'4 Id. (citations omitted).
115 The court defines intermediate storage as a temporary location for the mes-
sage to reside after the message is sent and before the message is retrieved. Id. at
633.
116 The court defines backup protection storage as a protective storage process
to be utilized in the event that the system crashes before the recipient retrieves
the message from intermediate storage. Id. at 633-34.
117 The court defines post-transmission storage as a location for storage of the
message after it has been retrieved. Id. at 634.
118 Id.
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tercept," which necessarily entails contemporaneity, the district
court concluded that the Wiretap Act only protects communica-
tions during the course of transmission. When the communica-
tions are retrieved, the transmission is over. 119  Because
Nationwide acquired the e-mail from post transmission storage,
a point in time where the email had already been retrieved and
transmission was complete, there was no interception.1
2 0
The district court's failure to find an unlawful access pursuant
to the SCA was based upon the court's understanding of how e-
mail transmission works and the court's adoption of the narrow
reading of "intercept."'12' The court focused on squaring the
definition of electronic storage122 with its description of e-mail
transmission. 123 Following the definition, the court concluded
that the SCA protects the transmission of messages that have ei-
ther been in intermediate storage pursuant to part (A) of the
definition, or in backup protection storage pursuant to part (B)
of the definition.12 4 The court singles out the phrase "for pur-
poses of backup protection of such communication" in part (B)
of the definition as evidence that messages in post-transmission
storage, after the transmission is complete, are not communica-
tions covered under the statutory definition of electronic stor-
age. 125 Because Nationwide acquired the e-mail from post-
transmission storage, when the e-mail message was no longer in
the course of transmission, the court ruled that the retrieval of
the e-mail did not violate the SCA.
1 26
119 Id.
120 Id. at 635.
121 Id. at 635-36.
122 Electronic storage is defined under the ECPA as "(A) any temporary, inter-
mediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission thereof; and (B) any storage of such communication by an elec-
tronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communica-
tion." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1993) (emphasis added).
123 Fraser, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 635-36.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 636.
126 Id. The Ninth Circuit recently criticized Fraser in Theofel v. Farey-Jones, re-
jecting the exclusion of post-transmission storage from the definition of backup
protection. Theofel v. Farey-Jones, Nos. 02-15742, 03-15301, 2003 WL 22020268,
at *4-5 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2003). The court in Theofel argued that if backup pro-
tection did not include any form of post-transmission storage and only included
communications still pending delivery, as suggested by Fraser, subsection B of 18
U.S.C. § 2510(17) would be rendered meaningless. Id. at *5. Backup protection
excluding post-transmission storage would render subsection B superfluous, the
court argued, because it "would already seem to qualify as 'temporary, intermedi-
ate storage' within the meaning of subsection (A)." Id. The author rejects this
8392003]
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e. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039 (11th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 123 S. Ct. 2120 (2003)
An anonymous computer hacker e-mailed information to po-
lice concerning files he found on Steiger's computer, which re-
vealed Steiger's sexual exploitation of children and possession
of child pornography. The threshold issue for the court was
whether an anonymous source that penetrated Steiger's com-
puter with a "Trojan Horse" virus 127 and downloaded files from
the computer "intercepted" any electronic communications in
violation of the Federal Wiretap Act. 128 The Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit held that: (1) a contemporaneous inter-
ception was required to violate the Wiretap Act with respect to
electronic communications, and (2) "the anonymous source did
not intercept electronic communications in violation of the
Wiretap Act."' 29 Although the court concluded that the infor-
mation retrieved from Steiger's computer falls within the statu-
tory definition of "electronic communication,"130 the court
failed to find an interception of the electronic communication
because it did not view the anonymous source's actions as a con-
temporaneous acquisition.' 3 ' It was critical to the court that the
information downloaded from Steiger's computer had been
stored on his computer. 13 2
The court's analysis states that it agrees with the interpreta-
tions of the Wiretap Act found in Konop and Steve Jackson Games.
The court further stated, however, that it does not rely on
them. 33 While the court apparently does not rely on either case
when assessing the applicability of the SCA,134 it seems to rely on
the cases when assessing whether the Wiretap Act was violated.
argument. Backup protection excluding post-transmission storage under subsec-
tion (B) is not equivalent to temporary, intermediate storage in subsection (A)
because subsection (B) includes the additional limitation of pertaining to storage
provided by an electronic communication service. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17) (1993).
Theofel fails to recognize this distinction. United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039,
1046 (11th Cir. 2003).
127 The Trojan Horse virus was used by the anonymous source to enable him to
view and download files from Steiger's computer. Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1044.
128 Id. at 1046. The district court declined to address the threshold issue. Id.
129 Id. at 1046-49.
130 See supra note 32.
131 Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1050.
132 See id. at 1049.
133 Id.
114 Id. Even though the applicability of the SCA was not a direct issue, the
court of appeals considered the question and concluded that the SCA would not
govern the hacking activities of the anonymous source. Id. The court came to
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In particular, the court of appeals seems to follow Konop when it
decided to apply one definition of "intercept" to govern wire
communications, and another to govern electronic
communications. 
35
C. USA PATRIOT ACT OF 2001
Enacted October 26, 2001, the USA Patriot Act has played an
important role in the history of the ECPA because it repealed
the express inclusion of stored wire communications from the
definition of wire communication. 36 This change was signifi-
cant because the opinions of Steve Jackson Games, Konop, and Stei-
ger previously rested on this textual distinction to hold that the
definition of "intercept," in the context of electronic communi-
cations, requires contemporaneity.13 7 Furthermore, the Konop
and Steiger opinions have interpreted this Congressional amend-
ment to signal that Congress wanted to re-instate the pre-ECPA
definition of "intercept" - acquisition contemporaneous with
transmission - with respect to wire communications.' The
idea that Congress implicitly approved the judicial definition of
"intercept" as requiring contemporaneity rests on the courts' as-
sumption that Congress was aware of the narrow definition
courts had given the term with respect to the unchanged defini-
tion of "electronic communications."'
' 39
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE ECPA
In the opinion of the author, the inability of courts and legal
scholars to "square" the two statutes primarily stems from poor
Congressional drafting of the ECPA. 140 Rather than following a
consistent model, Congress instead opted to define some statu-
tory terms in great detail and others in almost no detail.14 1 Al-
this conclusion because it did not find Steiger's computer to represent an elec-
tronic communication service as defined in section 2510(15). Id.
135 See id. at 1048-49.
136 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2001).
137 Konop, 302 F.3d at 877; Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62; Steiger, 318
F.3d at 1048.
138 Konop, 302 F.3d at 878; Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048-49.
139 Konop, 302 F.3d at 878; Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048-49.
140 Although this criticism is being constructed in hindsight, it seems fair be-
cause the Congressional shortcomings are of such a tone that one would suspect
them to emanate from incompetence rather than mistake.
141 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (explaining "wire communication" as includ-
ing stored information) with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (explaining "electronic corn-
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though silence is consistent with the presumption that Congress
acts with awareness of prevailing judicial constructions when it
reenacts or amends a law, 142 the existing judicial constructions
were anything but prevailing or widely accepted.' 43
Despite Congress' inability to pass a clear statute, judges
should also be admonished for failing to properly adjudicate
these matters. While judges have done an exceptional job ana-
lyzing both the language of the ECPA and its legislative history,
one cannot expect to produce an acceptable product when the
tools used to complete the job are defective. Instead of focusing
entirely on legislative history and statutory language that is am-
biguous, judges would likely rectify their problems if they con-
strued the ECPA in light of modern communications
technology. Even if one supposes that the language of the
ECPA and its legislative history were models of clear Congres-
sional construction, it would be foolish not to look to communi-
cations technology for guidance in statutory interpretation.
Understanding the concepts that enable modern day commu-
nication to occur in an electronic medium is crucial to under-
standing how the ECPA should be construed because it was the
rapid development of communications technology that moti-
vated the enactment of the ECPA. Without understanding what
motivated Congress to take action and enact the ECPA, i.e., the
cause of the legislation, there can be no hope for fair judicial
administration of the ECPA. It is equivalent to allowing a refe-
ree with a rulebook to officiate a game, even though the referee
has no concept of how the sport is actually played. Whether it is
a lack of appreciation or a case of apathy, the end result is the
same when judges fail to truly understand communications tech-
nology. They produce ad-hoc decisions, which in turn fail to
provide guidance to other courts.
munication" without mentioning whether stored information is included or
excluded).
142 See Native Vill. of Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 554 (9th
Cir. 1991).
143 When courts have debated whether Congress intended for the Turk con-
temporaneity rule to apply to both the Wiretap Act and the SCA of the ECPA, few
judges have adopted Turk's rather narrow reading of "intercept." See Konop, 236
F.3d at 1044 (stating that it knew of only one apparent adoption of Turk's reading
by a circuit court - a case that pre-dated the passage of the ECPA), withdrawn, 302
F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 n.11 (noting that the select few
cases involving wire communications that adopted a narrow definition of inter-
cept did so with little analysis).
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The following sections of this comment analyze the implica-
tions of the various judicial constructions of the ECPA.
A. STEVE JACKSON GAMES: ADOPTING A NARROW READING OF
INTERCEPT FOR THE WIRETAP ACT
When the Fifth Circuit found no violation of the Wiretap Act,
the decision largely depended on: (1) classifying the e-mail
messages as stored electronic communications, and (2) recog-
nizing that the definition of electronic communication, unlike
the definition of wire communication, does not include elec-
tronic storage of such communication. 44 The court of appeals
stated that the omission of "electronic storage" from the defini-
tion of electronic communication "reflects that Congress did
not intend for [a narrow reading of] intercept to apply to elec-
tronic communications when those communications are in elec-
tronic storage. 1 45
Although this case concerns electronic communications in
storage, it can likely be distinguished as a very narrow holding.
The case is distinguishable because the acquisition of the e-mail
communications in storage were the result of a physical seizure,
rather than a seizure through an electronic medium. Nonethe-
less, the errors in this opinion should be discussed because Ko-
nop and Steiger rely heavily on this opinion.
To begin with, when the court concluded that the narrow
reading of intercept does not apply to electronic communica-
tions in storage, it had already concluded that the proper read-
ing of intercept in the context of the Wiretap Act entailed
contemporaneous acquisition. The latter conclusion, which is
based in part upon a statement from a Senate Report providing
that "the definition of intercept under current law is retained
with respect to wire and oral communications[,]"' ' 46 is likely
wrong. The faulty conclusion assumes that the definition of in-
tercept under "current law" included a contemporaneity re-
quirement. Contrary to what the majority asserts, the "current
law" concerning the definition of intercept did not clearly adopt
the contemporaneity requirement. The extent to which the
"current law" promoted Turk was limited to a single case that
adopted the contemporaneity requirement before the ECPA was
144 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461.
145 Id. at 461-62.
146 Id. at 462.
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enacted. 4 ' Furthermore, if intercept were defined as solely con-
temporaneous acquisition, judges and scholars have suggested
that almost all acquisitions of electronic communications would
fall outside of the umbrella of statutory protection provided by
the Wiretap Act.'48
The court also likely erred in its reasoning by relying in part
on the exclusion of electronic storage from the definition of
electronic communication to militate a narrow definition of in-
tercept. Such reasoning is likely flawed because it assumes that
Congressional silence is indicative of Congress' intent to elimi-
nate stored electronic communications from the protective
boundaries of the Wiretap Act.149 A 1996 amendment to the
ECPA, which provided that an "electronic communication ...
does not include . . . electronic funds transfer information
stored by a financial institution ... [,]"5° indicates the opposite
of what the majority opinion suggests. The decision to exclude
certain kinds of stored information from the definition of elec-
tronic communications indicates that Congress understood the
definition of electronic communication to include stored
information.
Finally, the Fifth Circuit's reasoning is likely flawed because it
fails to consider the difference between "access," as used in the
SCA and "intercept," as used in the Wiretap Act. Whereas inter-
cept is statutorily defined as the actual acquisition of the con-
tents of a communication, 151 access, which is not statutorily
defined, is commonly defined to mean "getting near or into
contact with ... and to gain access to ... "152 The difference in
the terms indicates that Congress did not intend "access to a
communication" to equate with "acquisition to a communica-
tion." Rather, Congress likely intended the Wiretap Act to only
147 Konop, 302 F.3d at 1044 n.2.
148 Id. at 888 (Reinhardt,J., dissenting) (quotingJarrodJ. White, Commentary,
E-Mail@Work.Corn: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REV. 1079,
1083 (1997) ("Following the Fifth Circuit's rationale, [and excluding stored elec-
tronic communications from the intercept prohibition,] there is only a narrow
window during which an E-mail interception may occur - the seconds or millisec-
onds before which a newly composed message is saved to any temporary location
following a send command. Therefore .... [assuming that stored communica-
tions are excluded from the intercept prohibition,] interception of E-mail within
the prohibition of the ECPA is virtually impossible.")).
149 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461-62.
150 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12)(D) (1996).
151 See id. § 2510(4).
152 Konop, 302 F.3d at 889 (Reinhardt,J., dissenting) (quoting the definition of
access in the OXFORD ENGLISti DICTIONARY); see also Smith, 155 F.3d at 1058-59.
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prohibit the actual acquisition of a communication, while the
SCA would prohibit access to the communication. As pointed
out by the dissent in Konop, the Fifth Circuit "erroneously con-
flates the terms, reading them both to refer to the acquisition of
the contents of a communication.' 53
B. SMITH: REPUDIATION OF THE CONTEMPORANEITY
REQUIREMENT AND PROMOTION OF THE LESSER
INCLUDED OFFENSE THEORY
When the Ninth Circuit found a violation of the Wiretap Act,
the decision largely depended on: (1) the courts'rejection of the
narrow reading of intercept, and (2) the promotion and adop-
tion of the lesser included offense theory. Although the holding
of this case is restricted to issues concerning wire communica-
tions in storage, it is likely still persuasive for businesses or indi-
viduals concerned with the protection of stored electronic
communications because stored wire communications are tech-
nologically equivalent, in some instances, to stored electronic
communications.
The Ninth Circuit's repudiation of the contemporaneity re-
quirement that had previously been read into the term "inter-
cept" is not being questioned here. The reasoning utilized by
the court, however, is being brought into question. Rather than
recognizing that Congress possibly never intended for Turk to
be interpreted as the "current law,"'1 54 the Ninth Circuit relied
on the inclusion of storage within the definition of wire commu-
nication to repudiate the contemporaneity requirement. 55 The
court reasoned that if the Turk contemporaneity requirement
governed, the part of the definition of "wire communication"
referring to the inclusion of stored information would be ren-
dered "meaningless because messages in electronic storage can-
not, by definition, be acquired contemporaneously.1 56 While
this argument is logically sound, there is concern as to whether
it wilts under the USA Patriot Act's recent amendment, which
eliminated the inclusion of storage in the definition of wire
communication. 157
153 Konop, 302 F.3d at 891-92 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing Steve Jackson
Games, 36 F.3d at 463).
154 Supra note 143 and accompanying text.
155 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057-58.
156 Id. at 1058.
157 See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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There is also a judicial disagreement as to whether Smith re-
pudiated the contemporaneity requirement in whole, or only
with regard to wire communications. The opinion provides that
"to the extent that Turk stands for a definition of "intercept"
that necessarily entails contemporaneity, it has, at least in the
context of wire communications, been statutorily overruled.' '1 58
Contrary to the Konop and Steiger opinions, which read Smith as
stating that it only repudiates contemporaneity with regard to
wire communications, 159 Smith never stated that it only repudi-
ated the contemporaneity requirement for wire communica-
tions. The "at least" language of Smith suggests a minimal
amount of action or a floor, and thus supports the opposite of
what Konop and Steiger conclude. It suggests that the contempo-
raneity requirement is also likely repudiated for electronic
communications.
This argument is further supported by other arguments made
by the Ninth Circuit in Smith. Namely, the court argues that
contemporaneity does not govern wire communications because
it would not be viable to divide the statutory provisions between
those concerning in-progress wire communications and those
concerning in-storage wire communications. 6 ° Surely, the
court would not support a narrow reading of the term "inter-
cept" for electronic communications because that would only
promote a similar statutory division between in-progress elec-
tronic communications and in-storage electronic communica-
tions. Why would the court accept this statutory division when
they concluded that the exact same statutory division was not
viable with regard to wire communications?
The Ninth Circuit's promotion and adoption of a lesser-in-
cluded offense theory'6 ' is one of the few bright stars in the
ECPA's judicial pool of mud. A concept whereby "access" is a
lesser included offense of the "acquisition" of a communication
not only addresses the problems that originally motivated Con-
gress to pass the ECPA, but it also enables the Wiretap Act and
the SCA to co-exist without any provisions becoming superflu-
ous. The concept of a lesser included offense addresses the con-
cerns of Congress because it accounts for the computer hacker
who often does a great deal of damage to stored communica-
158 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 n.11 (original quotations omitted and secondary
emphasis added).
159 Konop, 302 F.3d at 877; Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048-49.
160 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1058.
161 Supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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tions facilities without ever acquiring the contents of those com-
munications. 112 Were Congress to prohibit only actual
acquisition of the contents of communications in storage, law
enforcement personnel would be powerless to do anything to
individuals such as hackers, who are likely to do damage without
ever acquiring communications.
These arguments also explain how the lesser-included offense
theory allows the two statutes to co-exist without creating redun-
dant provisions. Quite simply, it promotes a distinction between
the terms "access" and "intercept," and such a distinction sup-
ports the structure of the statutes. The interpretation supports
the SCA's ability to enforce lenient penalties against those who
only put themselves in the position to acquire a communication,
while allowing the Wiretap Act to enforce harsher penalties
against those who go further and acquire the communication.'6 3
C. THE KONOP AND STEIGER OPINIONS: Two DEFINITIONS FOR
INTERCEPT AND THE EFFECT OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT
The Konop and Steiger opinions, which base their decisions in
part on the Steve Jackson Games and Smith opinions,"' are flawed.
Both courts' assessments of whether the Wiretap Act governed
adopt a multi-definitional reading of the term intercept, such
that one definition is used to govern wire communications and
another is used to govern electronic communications. More
specifically, the courts attach a contemporaneous requirement
to intercept when a potential illegal interception of an elec-
tronic communication arises, but do not attach such a require-
ment to intercept when a potential illegal interception of a wire
communication arises. 6 5 Clearly, the only thing that these two
courts have accomplished is a twisted reading of the ECPA.
Somehow, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have come to the
rather unpersuasive conclusion that Congress intended differ-
ent definitions of the same word to govern different forms of
162 See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1059.
163 Id.
164 Although the court in Steiger states that it agrees but does not rely on the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits' previous interpretations of the Wiretap Act, it is evident
that it does rely on the previous cases as precedent when forming its decision
with regard to the applicability of the Wiretap Act. See supra notes 133-35 and
accompanying text. The Steiger court somehow feels that the manner in which it
denies protection from the SCA completely distinguishes itself from Konop. See
Steiger, 318 F.3d at 104849.
165 Konop, 302 F.3d at 877-78; Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1048-49.
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communication. As a result of this highly questionable conclu-
sion, neither court found that the Wiretap Act was implicated.
If this common reasoning stands for other courts to follow as
precedent, fragile businesses such as airlines, which have be-
come increasingly dependent upon the Internet to satisfy busi-
ness goals, will risk economic catastrophe.
Not only are the Konop and Steiger opinions unpersuasive, but
they are clearly flawed. The court in Konop, with which Steiger
agrees, claims to garner its support from Steve Jackson Games
when it focuses on the difference between the wire and elec-
tronic communication definitions that existed before the enact-
ment of the USA Patriot Act.166 While Konop is correct in
pointing out that Steve Jackson Games also recognized the differ-
ence between the statutory definitions,'67 Steve Jackson Games did
not rely on the difference between the statutory definitions to
adopt two different definitions for intercept. 6 ' Steve Jackson
Games does stand for a definition of "intercept" that entails con-
temporaneity, 69 but it does not stand for two different defini-
tions of "intercept" to govern wire and electronic
communications. It stands for only one governing definition. 70
Does Konop propose to adopt the reasoning of Steve Jackson
Games to further its conclusion of a contemporaneity require-
ment for electronic communications and then spurn the part of
the opinion that fails to further its conclusions concerning wire
communications?
The conclusions in Konop and Steiger concerning the multi-
definitional form of intercept are also flawed to the extent that
they rely on Smith to support the argument that a contempora-
neity requirement has only been repudiated with regard to wire
communications. As discussed earlier, Smith never stated that it
only repudiated the contemporaneity requirement for wire com-
munications.171 Instead, Smith suggests that the contemporane-
ity requirement is also likely repudiated for electronic
communications.172
166 Konop, 302 F.3d at 877 ("[rjelying on the same textual distinction as the
Fifth Circuit in Steve Jackson Games...").
167 Steve Jackson Games, 36 F.3d at 461.
111 See id. at 462.
,, See id. at 461-62.
170 See id. at 462.
171 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 n.11.
172 Id.
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To the degree that both Konop and Steiger claim that their rea-
soning is supported by the USA Patriot Act's recent amendment
to the ECPA, this claim is both unwarranted and flawed. This
argument should never have been an influence on either of the
decisions because "the views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one." 173
Furthermore, the argument that the amendment re-instated the
pre-ECPA definition of intercept - acquisition contemporane-
ous with transmission - with respect to wire communications is
flawed because it rests on the belief that Congress implicitly ap-
proved a judicial definition of "intercept" requiring contempo-
raneity. Such a belief requires an assumption that Congress was
aware of the narrow definition courts had given the term "inter-
cept" with respect to electronic communications. Considering
how muddy this jurisprudence is and how each court starts its
opinion by complaining about how convoluted the area of law
governing the ECPA is, 174 how could Congress have possibly be-
come aware of a common judicial definition for intercept with re-
gard to any form of communication? More importantly, how
could such a common judicial definition exist?
D. STEIGER: DOES THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
PROTECT BUSINESSES FROM COMPUTER HACKERS?
Although Steiger is troubling because the court found no viola-
tion of the Wiretap Act when a hacker used a "Trojan Horse"
virus to access and download files from another computer con-
nected to the Internet, it is even more troubling because it also
failed to find a breach of the SCA. The court failed to classify
the hacker's presence in the computer as an unauthorized ac-
cess pursuant to the SCA because it did not believe that the com-
puter whose security was breached was maintained as an
"electronic communication service." 175
This is clearly an example of a decision that is erroneous be-
cause the court did not understand the technology at issue.
Generally speaking, the Internet is composed of servers and cli-
173 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 109, 117
(1980) (quoted in Konop, 302 F.3d at 891 n.2 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (other
citations omitted)).
174 SupTa note 17 and accompanying text.
175 An "electronic communication service" is defined as: "any service which
provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic commu-
nications[.]" 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (1993).
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ents.'76 Computers that provide service to other machines are
servers and machines that are used to connect to servers are cli-
ents. '7 It is immaterial whether a person intends for his or her
computer to be a client or a server. If a hacker is able to gain
access into a computer on-line, the hacker becomes a user of
that computer and the computer becomes a server for the
hacker. Thus, the on-line computer that has been penetrated
gives the hacker the ability to send out information from that
computer at anytime. In other words, the computer that has
been penetrated provides a service which in turn provides users
thereof [i.e., a hacker] the ability to send or receive electronic
communications. Contrary to the majority's opinion, the facts
of Steiger fit the definition of "electronic communication service"
like a glove. 7 8
E. FRASER: ADOPTING A NARRow READING OF INTERCEPT FOR
BOTH STATUTES
When the Eastern District of Pennsylvania determined that
there was neither a violation of the Wiretap Act nor the SCA, it
based its decision on (1) the adoption of a narrow reading of
"intercept" that necessarily entails contemporaneity for both the
Wiretap Act and the SCA, and (2) the adoption of the lesser-
included offense theory. Although this comment has previously
suggested that the courts may be wrong for reading the term
intercept to require acquisition contemporaneous with transmis-
sion,"'79 this court utilizes a novel approach.
Rather than adopting the narrow reading of intercept to ap-
ply to only one form of communication or all forms of commu-
nication protected by the Wiretap Act, Fraser interprets the
narrow reading of intercept to apply to all communications in-
dependent of which statute governs. In other words, the court
foregoes any quantitative analysis and looks at all communica-
tions temporally. From this perspective, the determining factor
176 Jeff Tyson, How Internet Infrastructure Works, HowStuffWorks.com at http://
www.howstuffworks.com/internet-infrastructure5.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
177 Id.
178 While the integrity of the Steiger court is not questioned, there is concern
whether the judges presiding over this case had ulterior motives in mind. When
a case such as Steiger arises, in which the defendant is accused of sexual exploita-
tion of children and possession of child pornography, it would be understanda-
ble, but not acceptable, if a court lost track of its unbiased duty and became over-
run with emotion.
179 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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for whether interception has occurred is the point in time when
the message is acquired. 8" If the communication is acquired
before the communication is received, i.e., when the transmis-
sion ends, an unlawful interception has occurred. The court
thus held that both the Wiretap Act and SCA provide protection
for communication only while a communication is in the course
of transmission.181
This court also excelled where other courts have failed. In-
stead of merely brushing over the concepts of the underlying
technology buried within the issues, the court squared its legal
conclusion with the underlying technology. 18 2 The court ac-
complished this when it recognized that an electronic communi-
cation such as e-mail is still in transmission when it resides in
intermediate storage or a form of back-up protection storage.183
Although the court distinguished the withdrawn opinion
from Konop because it was factually dissimilar, the court later
states that the withdrawn opinion from Konop should be control-
ling. "'84 Despite the additional language supporting the with-
drawn Konop opinion, it is unlikely that Fraser can be construed
as supporting the lesser-included offense theory. The court
does not expressly state whether it agrees with such an analysis,
and it does not apply what the lesser-included offense theory
provides - a distinction between "intercept" and "access."
Rather than addressing the applicability of the SCA by question-
ing whether there was unauthorized access, the court simply
concluded that the statute did not govern because the message
was retrieved from post-transmission storage. 1 5
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW INTERPRETATION
OF THE ECPA
In light of the USA Patriot Act's recent amendment to the
ECPA and the apparent split between the Fifth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth Circuits, this comment has been written as a guide for
those who face the task of construing and/or administering the
Wiretap Act and the SCA. Thus, this comment proposes a new
interpretation of the ECPA. It proposes an interpretation that
110 Fraser, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 634.
181 Id. at 635, 637.
182 Id. at 633-34.
183 Id. at 634.
184 Id. at 636 ("In arguing that it should be controlling, Fraser was seduced by
the . . . Ninth Circuit [withdrawn] opinion in Konop.).
185 Id.
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(1) addresses the issues Congress faced when it enacted the
ECPA, (2) follows the plain language of the statutes, (3) pro-
vides technological flexibility, and (4) affords privacy and pro-
tection to both the public and business sectors. It proposes an
interpretation that combines the lesser-included offense theory
from Smith with the transmission/storage dichotomy exposed in
Fraser.
A. A CONTEMPORANEOUS ACQUISITION/ACCESS READING,
INDEPENDENT OF WHICH STATUTE GOVERNS, PERMITS A READING
OF THE WIRETAP ACT AND THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
THAT Is CONSISTENT WITH CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, FOLLOWS
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES, PROVIDES
TECHNOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY, AND AFFORDS PRIVACY
AND PROTECTION
The interpretation of the ECPA promoted by this comment
suggests that when a court is forced to determine whether there
is an unauthorized interception pursuant to the Wiretap Act or
an unauthorized access pursuant to the SCA, the court should
look at the facts from two different angles. More specifically,
the court should view the actions of the defendant from both a
temporal and a quantitative perspective.
1. At What Point in Time Is the Communication Acquired or
Accessed?
The court should first determine whether the defendant's ac-
tions took place during the transmission of the communication
or when the transmission was over and was in post-transmission
storage. The temporal analysis is thus the critical question.
While it does not solely determine whether a violation of the
ECPA occurred, the second part of the test would be moot if a
court determined that the communication in question was in
post-transmission storage during all phases of the defendant's
alleged activities.
2. Was the Defendant Merely in a Position to Acquire the
Communication, or Did He Actually Acquire the
Communication?
Assuming that the court finds questionable activity by the de-
fendant while the communication is still in transmission, the
second phase of the test charges a court with determining
whether the defendant's actions constituted an unauthorized
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"interception" or "access." In other words, the court must deter-
mine whether the defendant was merely in a position to acquire
the communication or whether he actually acquired the
communication.
3. Balancing Congressional Intent with Technology and Protection
A proposed interpretation of the ECPA that focuses on
whether a communication is in storage or transmission, and on
whether the communication has been accessed or intercepted
balances all the concerns of each party.
a. Following Congressional Intent
The proposed interpretation is consistent with congressional
intent because it follows the language of the statute and sup-
ports the contrasting penalty schemes. Acknowledging the dif-
ference between "intercept" and "access" is critical because it
promotes the adoption of the "lesser included offense theory."
This theory, which is based on the degree of intrusion, is sup-
ported by both textual and structural considerations. First, it
comports with the statutory definition of "intercept" and the or-
dinary meaning of "access." '86 Second, it supports the contrast-
ing penalty schemes assigned to each act.1" 7
The fact that criminal violations of the Wiretap Act are punished
more severely than those of the Stored Communications Act re-
flects Congress's considered judgment regarding the relative cul-
pability that attaches to violations of those provisions and
supports our conclusion that a violation of the latter is, concep-
tually, a "lesser included offense" of the former.' 8
Third, the separation of "access" from "intercept" explains the
absence of an evidentiary exclusion remedy from the SCA.1 9
While it would be appropriate to prevent the contents of an ille-
gally intercepted communication from being introduced in
court, there would be no need for an exclusion remedy if some-
one merely accesses, but does not acquire, a communication. 9 °
Finally, this proposed interpretation does not force any provi-
186 Smith, 155 F.3d at 1051-59.
187 Id. at 1059 (comparing 18 U.S.C. § 2707 and § 2701(b) with § 2520 and
§ 2511, respectively).
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sion of the statutes to become redundant or superfluous.''
Rather, it allows each provision of each statute to coexist with
the other. 19
2
b. Adapting to Technology
The proposed interpretation is flexible enough to co-exist
with rapidly developing technology because a temporal analysis
in the context of the SCA recognizes that temporary storage
does not terminate transmission. Fraser recognized this first
hand when comparing the steps involved in an e-mail transmis-
sion with the statutory definition of "electronic storage."' 93 The
court's comparison demonstrated that an electronic communi-
cation process such as e-mail, which inherently includes inter-
mediate or backup storage, can still be intercepted or acquired
contemporaneously. Therefore, the court confirmed that the
law could account for technology. If a court can determine
when a transmission has been totally completed, or when it has
been actually received, the issue of how to delineate between the
transmission and storage phase becomes less burdensome.
The picture becomes slightly more complicated when consid-
ering an unauthorized access of a website. In determining
whether the alleged unauthorized website access occurred
before or after the transmission was completed, courts will have
to consider the implications of cache. 94 Cache, a temporary
storage device, increases the complexity of the analysis once an
individual has accessed his or her user account on a website for
the first time. At this point in time, the browser on a computer
caches or temporarily stores the HTML page into the com-
puter's memory."' The next time the user requests access to
the same web page, the browser determines whether the date of
the file requested on the Internet is newer than the one
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Fraser, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 636.
194 In the context of the Web, cache is essentially a small temporary memory
bank that provides quick retrieval of Web objects such as HTML documents. By
storing frequently used web objects in a convenient location, caching creates the
distinct advantages of reduced bandwidth consumption, reduced server loads,
and reduced latency. See Brian D. Davison, Web Caching Overview, Web-Cach-
ing.com at http://www. web-caching.com/welcome.html (last visited Sept. 7,
2003).
195 Guy Provost, How Caching Works, HowStuffWorks.com at http://www.how
stuffworks.com/cache2.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
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cached.'9 6 If the dates are the same, the computer's browser
retrieves the file from cache rather than from the Internet. A
court must therefore determine whether cache is being used as
temporary storage or post-transmission storage. Such a conclu-
sion is critical when attempting to determine whether the al-
leged activities of a cyber intruder occurred before or after the
electronic communication transmission completed.' 97
c. Providing Protection
The proposed interpretation affords proper protection to
both private and business oriented groups because it supports
the contrasting penalty schemes while also providing a protec-
tive shield against criminals that may gain access without actually
acquiring a communication.' 98 While this proposed interpreta-
tion does leave an unprotected hole where a communication
has already been received and the transmission is consequently
over, it is a very narrow hole that is only completely vulnerable
to a physical seizure. If a communication that has been received
and stored is accessed by a hacker through an electronic me-
dium, then it could likely still be argued that the SCA governs.
For what minor lapses in protection that do surface, courts must
recognize that, even in the original Wiretap Act, Congress did
not intend to protect all intrusions into an individual's pri-
vacy.' 99 Indeed, scholars have noted that the strong expectation
of privacy of communications diminishes once a transmission is
complete.20 0
With regard to on-line business ventures and airlines in partic-
ular, there is admittedly some concern that the economic com-
pensation afforded an airline under either statute for an
instance of cyber intrusion would likely not be sufficient enough
to compensate the airline for its full economic loss. 20 ' However,
!96 Id.
197 Generally speaking, when comparing the date of a cached file with the date
of the file on the Internet, the file from the Internet will come first in time if new
information has been added to the user's account. If an individual gains access
to a user's web account on a website before the user has retrieved the informa-
tion, the individual would be receiving the information before the intended
transmission to the true user was completed. This individual would thus be inter-
cepting the information from the user's account.
198 See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1058-59.
199 See Turk, 526 F.2d at 658-59.
200 See Akamine, supra note 42.
20, Even if both statutes provided for substantial compensation, the typical
cyber criminal would be unable to financially meet the requisite civil damages.
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the significance of the judicial interpretations does not concern
compensation; 2112 rather, the significance lies in the fact that
they do nothing to deter such activities from occurring in the
future. Deterrence is the primary and implicit form of protec-
tion that an airline or any other business entity seeks when it
chooses to hide under a statutory umbrella. Thus, if the judicial
ruling in Konop had triggered the protection of the Wiretap Act
for the unauthorized interception of data on a web site instead
of triggering the SCA, the stiffer penal and civil penalties that
would apply to the perpetrators would serve as a more forceful
deterrent. The current judicial interpretations of the ECPA in
the context of unauthorized web access and interception pro-
vide little to no deterrence, and thus afford little to no protec-
tion to airlines and other business entities with significant
financial investments in on-line business ventures.
There is no doubt that legal scholars who disagree with the
proposal set forth in this comment will cite a lack of website
incapacitation among the airlines as positive and encouraging
proof that the current set of statutory regulations and judicial
interpretations do indeed deter. Although such an argument
seems logical, it is flawed. A theory that allows one to imply that
a procedural safeguard is effective just because an unfortunate
victim has not suffered an injustice is a theory that smacks of
ignorance. While the airline industry in America has not yet en-
countered any significant on-line criminal activity or unautho-
rized cyber exposure, the international community of airlines
has not been so fortunate. A recent controversy embroiling
both the German Parliament and the national flagship air car-
rier Lufthansa, which is believed to have emanated from an un-
authorized access of the carrier's private data, suggests that it is
inappropriate for, airlines to assume that their on-line data stor-
age systems are impregnable.
This political controversy surfaced in the Bundestag, Ger-
many's parliament, when German media, including the mass-cir-
culation newspaper Bild, published the names of several
politicians who allegedly cashed in bonus miles earned on politi-
202 Even if the perpetrator of the cyber crime could meet the financial demand
of substantial civil damages, financial compensation will not be able to remedy
every injustice absorbed by the victim. As airlines are experiencing first hand in a
post-September 1 1th world, no fixed amount of money will ever immediately
cure the corrosion of consumer confidence.
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cal flights for personal travel.203 While such a scandal may be
considered common in the American political arena, the affair
in Germany led to the resignation of Gregor Gysi, an economics
minister in the city-state of Berlin who is a prominent member
of the Party of Democratic Socialism.2 0 4 At the peak of the scan-
dal, Lufthansa was the subject of enormous criticism for its role
in the affair and, thus, likely suffered considerable damage to its
public reputation. Despite accusations of violating the country's
personal data protection laws by supplying the names of the pol-
iticians to the newspapers, Lufthansa held steadfast and refused
to comply with subsequent demands requesting the airline to
release a list of all elected officials who have used miles earned
during government travel for personal use.20 5 Lufthansa's sub-
sequent actions in the wake of the controversy suggest that it
never released the information voluntarily, but was instead the
unfortunate victim of an unauthorized access and disclosure of
proprietary data.20 6
V. CONCLUSION
In light of the legislative and judicial history of the ECPA, it is
understandable that courts continue to find the intersection be-
tween the Wiretap Act and the SCA a complex and convoluted
area of the law. The courts themselves recognize that they have
"struggled to analyze problems involving modern technology
within the confines of this statutory framework, often with unsat-
isfying results. ' 2 ' The courts have further stated that "until
Congress brings the laws in line with modern technology, pro-
tection of the Internet... will remain a confusing and uncertain
203 Roland Eggleston, Germany: Politician Resigns Over Frequent-Flyer-Miles Scan-
dal, Radio Free Europe at http://www.rferl.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2003). While
frequent flyer programs such as Lufthansa's "Bonus Miles" program are common
to almost all Western airlines, German politicians are forbidden from earning
frequent flyer points while on official business trips. Id.
204 Id. A handful of other German politicians, including the Green Party's
Rezzo Schlauch, were also enveloped by the scandal. Id.
205 Bonus Mile Scandal Consumes a Top Berlin Official, DW-WORLD.DE (Jan. 8,
2002), at http://www.dw-world.de/english/0,3367,1432 A 601601,00.html.
206 Despite Lufthansa's pleas of innocence, the German Federal Commissioner
for Data Security, Joachim Jacob, led further attacks against the air carrier, stat-
ing that when over 4,000 employees have access to customer data, it is decidedly
too many. German News Team, Thierse on the Frequent Flyer Miles Scandal, German
News (English Edition) at http://www.mathematik.uni-ulm.de/de-news/2 0 0 2 /
08/032100.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
207 Konop, 302 F.3d at 874; Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1047.
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area of the law."'2 8 While no one doubts that the burden on the
judicial system is quite onerous when courts are held responsi-
ble for administering a legislative bill that is far from clear, 20 9
the failure of Congress to listen to the judicial cries for help is
not an excuse for judicial incompetence.2 ° Instead of focusing
entirely on legislative history and statutory language that is am-
biguous, courts would likely rectify their problems if they con-
strued the ECPA in light of modern communications
technology. While some courts, such as Fraser, have made con-
certed efforts to do just this, many courts do not understand the
concepts that enable modern day communication to occur in an
electronic medium.
Applying common law rules to different forms of technology
without truly understanding the intricacies of that technology
does nothing more than afford airlines and other businesses a
legislative bill without teeth. Courts should thus consider the
proposed interpretation of the ECPA that is set forth in this
comment. It proposes a fair interpretation that (1) addresses
the issues Congress faced when it enacted the ECPA, (2) follows
the plain language of the statutes, (3) provides technological
flexibility, and (4) affords privacy and protection to both the
public and business sectors. It proposes an interpretation that
combines the lesser-included offense theory from Smith with the
transmission/storage dichotomy exposed in Fraser.
208 Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1047.
209 See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(recounting Judge Harold Leventhal's description of the use of legislative history
as "the equivalent of entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the
heads of the guests for one's friends." cited in Smith, 155 F.3d at 1056 n.9).
210 The Steigercourt ends its analysis of the ECPA by concluding that its reading
of the Wiretap Act and the SCA reveals a legislative hiatus that creates no remedy.
Steiger, 318 F.3d at 1049. This conclusion is erroneous. It is the judicial construc-
tion of the ECPA that yields no remedy.
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